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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WASH-A-MATIC, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

-vs-

13688

WILLIS RUPP, a/k/a WILLIE RUPP,
Defendant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant sought review of a decision of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, dismissing appellant's action for breach
of contract against respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant filed the instant action against the respondent on the 15th day of September, 1972, alleging
breach of contract. An answer was duly filed and the
matter tried on March 21, 1974, before the Honorable
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge. On the 8th day of April,
1974, Judge Baldwin entered judgment for the respondent and against plaintiff dismissing plaintiff's cause of
action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that this Court should affirm
the trial Court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following Statement of Facts
as being more in keeping with the proposition that on
appeal the facts will be reviewed in a light most favorable
to the trial Court's verdict.
The appellant's complaint alleged that on or about
the 5th day of August, 1971, appellant and respondent
entered into a written contract for the purchase, by respondent, of a car wash and related equipment (R. 53).
Appellant further alleged that the equipment was delivered to the respondent pursuant to the contract which
was refused and that as a result appellant sustained
damages.
Mr, Bert Nelson, a service representative for Nelson
Service and Livingston, received information from a friend
that the respondent might be interested in a car wash
(R. 60). Mr. Nelson met with Mr. Rupp in the summer
of 1971. Rupp indicated he was interested. In view of the
type of car wash in which Rupp had an interest, Mr.
Nelson felt it would be best to contact Mr. Jack ThurDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mond of Wash-A-Matic, the appellant (R. 61). Mr.
Thurmond received word from Nelson that Rupp may be
a good car wash prospect (R. 70). Mr. Thurmond met
with Rupp at his office and discussed the pros and cons
of a car wash operation. Initially they did not discuss
cost but merely equipment that might be reasonable for
the location at 4700 South Redwood Road (R. 71). Rupp
was of the opinion that he did not have any zoning
problems because there had been an auto wrecking yard
at the site previously (R. 135). Several days later, Nelson and Thurmond again met at Rupp's office and discussed various means of financing with one means being
leasing of the car wash to be obtained through Wash-AMatic, through Capitol Goods and Leasing Company (R.
72). Alternative locations were considered and a Mr.
Martin of Equipment Leasing later also examined Rupp's
property but no arrangements were made at that time
for any lease (R. 75). There was also discussion about
obtaining financing locally either through a bank or
through a leasing company (R. 153, 72).
On October 5, 1971, Rupp executed an order for equipment (Exhibit P-l). That order expressly provided that
it was "subject to financing and equipment selection"
and that the $200 check given at the time of the execution of the order was refundable if financing was not arranged. Exhibit 1-P also provided:
This contract is contingent upon the availability to the purchaser of financing as set
forth on the front of this contract. Upon apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proval of purchaser's credit, purchaser will
execute such forms and papers as are required
by the finance factor as evidence of indebtedness and the security therefore, and furnish
co-makers and guarantors, if required.
According to Mr. Thurmond, the President of appellant
Wash-A-Matic, the original order form was drawn up to
get the equipment into operation (R. 76). The "subject
to financing" portion of the contract was handwritten by
Thurmond (R. 76). Thurmond testified:
. . . the contract was subject to financing
arrangement of financing. H e had made application for financing but had not been approved
at that particular time.
Q. Is that the reason why that phase
was placed—
A. That is the reason the phase was put
in there that if he was unable to arrange his
financing or if we were unable to arrange the
financing we would refund his money and he
wouldn't be under any obligation.
Exhibit 2-P, a similar order, unsigned by Rupp, was submitted to Capitol Leasing, a local corporation, to obtain
financing for Mr. Rupp whereby he could acquire the
car wash. Capitol Leasing declined the contract a week
or two after it was submitted (R. 79, 137). Thereafter,
Thurmond suggested that financing be obtained through
Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing in California (R. 73).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Rupp submitted some original credit papers to Mr.
Martin. Exhibit 3-P was a form prepared by Thurmond
for submission to Equipment Leasing to obtain financing.
Exhibit 3-P was never executed by Rupp. Thereafter,
Equipment Leasing requested additional statements from
Rupp concerning his financial condition. Rupp thereafter
supplied Equipment Leasing with additional information
but never saw a lease agreement nor was he advised as
to what the terms of any lease would include (R. 139).
Thurmond asked Livingston Industries, a manufacturer
of car wash equipment, to go ahead with the equipment
"on confirmation of the financing." (R. 93). Thurmond
never saw any lease agreement or proposed lease agreement between Equipment Leasing and respondent (R.
113). It was up to the Equipment Leasing company to
purchase the equipment from Wash-A-Matic and lease
it to Rupp if they were to finance the activity (R. 114).
Exhibit 3-P was never executed by Equipment Leasing
and in order for a sale to occur a sale and lease agreement still had to be executed (R. 118). Equipment Leasing never executed a contract to purchase from the appellant with a view towards leasing back to Rupp (R.
119). After Rupp had submitted the additional financing
documents to Equipment Leasing, it requested an additional $1,000 (R. 141) and Rupp advised Martin that
he did not have $1,000 at that time (R. 150, 151). Rupp
was never approached with any form of a lease proposed
by Equipment Leasing for financing the acquisition of
the car wash (R. 151). No arrangement was consumated
with Equipment Leasing.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The deposition of Ted Martin of Equipment Leasing indicated that he had a commitment for funding
through Chase-Manhattan Bank (Deposition 9). That
he never worked out a schedule of payments for Rupp
(Deposition 12). He indicated that Equipment Leasing
would actually draw up the lease for the transaction
between his company and Rupp, but he couldn't say if
any lease was ever presented to Rupp (Deposition 19).
He indicated the purchase order would have to be different and that it would reflect that the car wash equipment was sold by Wash-A-Matic to Equipment Leasing
and leased to Rupp (R. 21). That before they would finance the matter, the lease would have to be signed by
their customer (Deposition 33, 34), and that the lease
would have to be submitted to Chase-Manhattan to obtain the bank's approval (Deposition 20). When the
$1,000 was not forthcoming from Rupp, the credit extended by Chase Manhattan expired within 30 days
(Deposition 11).
Car wash equipment was shipped by Livingston Industries at appellant's request to Rupp before any financing had been arranged and although one or two
items were initially kept on his property, Rupp refused
the major shipment (R. 96). Rupp indicated that he,
Thurmond and Martin subsequently attended a zoning
hearing in Utah and that Rupp was unable to obtain
zoning and building approval. Wash-A-Matic thereafter
returned the equipment to Livingston Industries. The
trial Court found that the parties entered into the agreement subject to financing and equipment sdection, that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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respondent was unable to obtain financing locally (R.
12), that respondent was advised that financing was
available through Equipment Leasing of California subject to approval of defendant's credit, acceptance by
Equipment Leasing Company's bank and the execution
of a lease acceptable to the bank and Equipment Leasing. That no lease relating to the acquisition of the car
wash equipment was ever submitted to the respondent
for execution. The Court concluded as a matter of law
and fact that there was no binding contract or agreement between the parties (R. 13).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WAS NO
BINDING CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT
FORMULATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
SUPPORTED BY LAW.
The respondent submits that the appellant's contention that as a matter of law the findings of the trial
court are insufficient to sustain the judgment is without
merit. The order which respondent executed, Exhibit
1-P, provides two separate legal standards upon which
to determine whether there was a binding contract. The
reverse of the contract provides that it was "contingent
upon the availability to the purchaser of financing as
set forth on the front of the contract" Further, it provides that such contracts and agreements as were neces-
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sary to the financial factor would be executed by the purchaser. On the front of the contract in the handwriting
of John Thurmond, President of the appellant, there
was written "subject to financing and equipment selection" and it was noted that the deposit check of Rupp
was refundable if financing was not arranged. The order
was prepared by the appellant both in printed form and
in handwritten form. Under these circumstances, the contract is to be construed in a light most favorable to the
respondent and against the appellant to the extent that
there is any ambiguity. In Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah
2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965) this Court observed:
I n addressing this problem, certain principles should be kept in mind. The first is that
in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of the
contract, it should be construed most strictly
against its framer, Amsco. A particularized
application of this well-recognized doctrine is
that it seems manifestly unfair to permit one
who formulates a contract to so fashion it as
to mislead the other party by setting forth a
clearly apparent promise or representation in
order to induce acceptance, and then designedly 'burying' elsewhere in the document, in
fine print, provisions which purport to limit
or take away the promise, and/or preclude recovery for failure to fulfill it.
In Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003
(1972) citing numerous prior cases from this Court it
was stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I t is axiomatic that language in a written instrument is interpreted more strongly against
a scrivener who executes it.
Appellant may not take the language on the reverse of
the contract and limit the handwritten language on the
front of the contract which clearly evidences a condition
precedent that financing be arranged before the respondent was to be bound. As the trial Court's findings indicate, the parties had considered three separate forms
of financing: Direct purchase, local bank financing, and
leasing. If leasing were to be the accepted means of financing which was that means most preferred by the
appellant, it would be necessary for the lessor to purchase
the property from the appellant through it own factoring and lease to the respondent. No lease agreement
was ever prepared, which was a condition to such financing. Also, the respondent had been refused local
lease financing. Additionally, it was necessary for the
parties to agree upon the terms of any financing. In
Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co., Ltd.,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 297, the court considered a stipulation
in a contract for the sale of goods which related to the
opening by the buyer of a banker's confirmed credit. The
court observed:
What is the legal position of such a stipulation? Sometimes it is a condition precedent to
the formation of a contract, that is, it is a
condition which must be fulfilled before any
contract is concluded at all. I n those cases the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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10
stipulation 'subject to the opening of a credit'
is rather like a stipulation 'subject to contract.'
If no credit is provided, there is no contract
between the parties.
In Associated Inv. Co. v. Cayias, 55 Utah 377, 185 P&c.
778 (1919) this Court approved the following language,
"Conditions precedent call for the performance of some
act or the happening of some event after a contract is
entered into and upon the performance or happening of
which its obligations are made to depend." In 17 Am.
Jur. 2d Contracts § 321, it is observed:
A condition may be precedent either to
the existence of a contract or to an obligation
immediately to perform the contract. A condition precedent to an obligation to perform
calls for the performance of some act or the
happening of some event after a contract is
entered into, upon the performance or happening of which the obligation to perform immediately is made to depend.
See also Restatement of Contracts, § 250. Therefore, before there was any obligation on the part of Rupp to
pay any money or accept delivery of any goods it was
necessary that the factoring and financing arrangements
be worked out. This was acknowledged by Mr. Thurmond in his own testimony.
The appellant cites Wilson v. Gray, 226 P.2d 726
(Cal. App. 1951) for a contention that the condition
precedent was met. This case does not support appellant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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position. In that case, the parties had a specific contract
and amount in mind and the actual financing was not
dependent upon a third party contracting with any of the
other parties by way of lease or purchase. Even so, the
Court held there had to be an agreement on the part of
the prospective creditor to make the loan contemplated.
By the testimony of Mr. Martin in the instant case before any loan would in fact be made or an agreement
to make a loan, as distinct from a mere willingness, there
had to be prepared a lease agreement which required the
approval of the Chase-Manhattan Bank. Thus, the terms
of the lease-sale-re-lease agreement were critical to obtaining financing and those terms simply bad not been
established. Further, before such terms were arrived at,
the Chase Manhattan Bank foreclosed the availability
of the funds to Equipment Leasing Company. Additionally, it became apparent that the contract could not be
financed because of the commercial inability to maintain
the object of the contract, to wit: the consitruction of
the carwash, since approval could not be obtained. At
best, the "subject to financing" provisions on the front
of the contract merely made Exhibit 1-P an agreement
to agree. The term "financing" must be considered more
than merely a willingness to extend credit. In Reese v.
Walker, 151 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Mun. 1958) the court held
that where securing of necessary financing by the purchasers was a condition precedent to proceeding under
the terms of a contract for purchase, but where the contract did not specify what was meant by necessary fi-
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nancing, that only the purchasers could determine what
finances they needed. With reference to the term, the
court observed:
I n the Court's judgment the phrase 'contingent upon securing necessary financing'
would mean to a layman 'If we can borrow the
money we need to finance the purchase on
terms we can repay'. Defendant argues that
plaintiffs were able to borrow the amount they
needed and therefore did get 'necessary financing.' But 'financing' in its ordinary meaning
connotes more than simply the face amount
of a loan. I t includes the interest rate, the
term, the rate of repayment and other terms
and conditions. I t means a loan on terms that
the borrower can repay. Under the contract as
executed only the buyers can determine what
financing they need. Having signed the contract without specifying what financing was
'necessary financing', the seller is in no position to complain if the buyers state they needed
a loan with payments as a certain rate. Of
course, buyers must show good faith. They
cannot defeat the contract by their own fault.
They must honestly determine what kind of a
loan they need and must make a bona fide
effort to obtain it. This, the evidence shows,
is what plaintiffs did in the case now before
us.
The condition precedent to consummation
of the contract having been impossible of fulfillment, the contract is terminated and plaintiffs are entitled to a return of their earnest
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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money deposit as prayed for. Entry may be
presented accordingly. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the subject to financing provision of the agreement between appellant and respondent required more
than just the interest of Equipment Leasing in ultimately financing the acquisition of a car wash by Rupp.
Many things were required to be done.
In Davison v. Robbins, 20 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d
1026 (1973), this Court recognized that under such circumstances there is no binding contract. In that case
this Court observed:
This writing constituted a mere expression of
a purpose to make a contract in the future,
for the whole matter was contingent on further
negotiations. The trial court erred in its conclusion that the writing constituted a valid, enforceable contract.
See also, Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d
427 (1961). In the instant case the agreement between
appellant and respondent must be construed againt respondent. This Court has consistently held the facts on
appeal are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party prevailing below and if any evidence of record
will support the trial Court's conclusions they should be
sustained, Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680
(1954). The trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law being supported by evidence of record, it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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must be concluded that there was no binding contract
between appellant and respondent.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT
THE SUBJECT TO FINANCING CLAUSE
WAS EITHER WAIVED OR EXCUSED BY
RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT CANNOT BE
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
The appellant raises three contentions as to why the
condition precedent in the agreement between appellant
and respondent should not govern this appeal. Appellant contends the condition of financing was waived, excused or an oral contract existed independent of the written contract for the purchase of the equipment. An
examination of the appellant's complaint shows that none
of these three concepts were plead. An examination of
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicates that no findings or conclusions were made on
any of these concepts. Consequently, it is obvious that
appellant is raising each of the three theories for the first
time on appeal. It has long been the accepted rule in
this jurisdiction that a position not presented to the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
State By and Through Its Road Commission v. Larkin,
27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); In re Ekker Estate,
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Ruber v. Deep Creek
Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956); DrumDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., I l l Utah 289, 177
P.2d 903 (1947). It is therefore submitted that each of
these contentions should be dismissed as inappropriate
for this appeal.
However, respondent further contends that the evidence in the instant case does not justify the application of any of these doctrines. The trial Court in Findings 5 through 9 found:
5. That subsequent to the subscribing to
the document by the parties, plaintiff and defendant continued negotiations with respect
to the type and availability of car wash equipment and sought to find financing of the equipment.
6. That in connection with the negotiations, defendant:
(a)

Contacted his bank;

(b)

Contacted the Capitol Goods Supply and Leasing Company of Salt
Lake City; and

(c)

Contacted Equipment Leasing of
California, at San Bernardino, California.

7. Defendant was unable to obtain from
his bank or Capitol Goods Supply and Leasing Company the necessary financing.
8. Defendant was advised financing was
available to him by Equipment Leasing Company of California subject to approval of deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant's credit, acceptance by Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., of New York, New York of
appropriate documentation, including an executed lease acceptable to the bank. That no
appropriate documentation, no prepared lease
nor execution lease was submitted to Chase
Manhattan Bank.
9. That a lease relating to the subject
matter of negotiations was never submitted to
the defendant for execution by him by any
financial institution, the plaintiff or any leasing
company.
To these findings appellant made no objection.
Waiver
In Ahrendt v. Babbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229 P.2d 296
(1951) this Court recognized that a condition precedent
to a contract could be waived. In that case, the assignee
in a particular contract setting had a right to receive particular consideration but treated the contract as in effect
without receiving consideration. By analogy a waiver of
the condition precedent in this case could only be found
if Mr. Rupp having a right to treat the contract as not
obligating him until he secured financing went ahead and
performed the contract without having secured the financing. The evidence in this case simply does not sustain a finding of such conduct. In 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 392, it is stated:
Conditions precedent may be viewed by
the party in whose favor they are made. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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performance of a condition precedent may be
waived, by the party in whose favor it is stipulated, either expressly or by implication resulting from his acts or conduct. 'Waiver/
when used in connection with the required
performance of a condition, has its usual meaning of a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. (Emphasis added).
In the instant case the findings of the Conrt and the evidence clearly indicate there was no intention on the part
of Mr. Rupp to waive his right to select equipment or
to secure financing before the contract would become
binding. He submitted papers to one company to obtain
financing and was refused. At the request of Thurmond,
an effort to obtain financing through Equipment Leasing
was made and the financing was never accomplished. At
no time did Mr. Rupp ever indicate that he was willing
to go forward with the transaction until appropriate financing had been secured. The appellant attempts to invoke the provisions of the agreement that indicate that
the contract cannot be cancelled "after manufacture begins." However, this language which must be construed
in harmony with other sections and against the appellant
if ambiguous merely means that the contract after having become fully in effect cannot be cancelled. There was
no effort made on Mr. Rupp's part to cancel the contract rather the contract never came to fruition since
financing was never obtained. Under the facts of record,
it cannot be said that there was a knowing and intentional waiver of the condition precedent by Rupp. It was
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Thurmond who wanted the order evidenced by P-l in
order to start manufacturing. Although Rupp was anxious to get moving Rupp did not indicate he would purchase without financing.
Excused
The appellant contends that the condition precedent
to respondent's liability under their agreement was excused by the conduct of respondent. The findings of the
trial court demonstrate the substantial effort made by
respondent to obtain financing. The appellant contends
that respondent did not exercise good faith in his effort
to obtain financing because he did not advance the $1000
requested by Equipment Leasing. Nothing could be
further from the truth. The respondent submitted financial information to Capitol Goods and Leasing and was
refused credit (R. 79). Thereafter at Wash-A-Matic's request, arrangements were made to obtain leasing financing through Mr, Martin of Equipment Leasing. Rupp
supplied initial information. He always indicated a desire to go forward with the project. Martin of Equipment Leasing requested additional information from Rupp
subsequent to the initial information provided. Rupp
submitted the additional information (R. 146). Martin
asked for an additional $1000; Rupp had already deposited $200 and his agreement required no more. Rupp
didn't have $1000 cash and advised Martin of that fact
and indicated he would see what he could do (R. 151).
In the meantime, the 30 day credit commitment lapsed
(Deposition p. 11). However, before any financing could
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
take place bank approval of the lease was necessary
(Deposition p. 20), and it would be necessary that a new
purchase order between Wash-A-Matic and Equipment
Leasing be made out which was never done (Deposition
p. 21). Wash-A-Matic and Equipment Leasing never did
what was necessary to consummate the transaction. All
parties dropped the possibility of financing when building approval was refused. Rupp, Thurmond and Martin
all attended a hearing in an effort to overcome the building permit obstacle but could not do so (R. 142, 154).
The Restatement of Contracts § 295 provides:
If a promisor prevents or hinders the occurrence of a condition, or the performance of
a return promise, and the condition would have
occurred or the performance of the return
promise been rendered except for such prevention or hinderance, the condition is executed,
and the actual or threatened nonperformance
of the return promise does not discharge the
promisor's d u t y , . . . " (emphasis added)
The evidence and findings of the Court in no way
support a prevention or hinderance on the part of Rupp,
rather they show an earnest effort on the part of Rupp
to do what was necessary to go forward with the contemplated project. However, all parties to the transaction could not consummate the deal. In Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d 66, 328 P.2d 307 (1958) this Court
applied the principle of the restatement, but the facts
showed a deliberate and wilful action by a party to pre-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
vent the performance of a contract. The facts of this case
and the findings of the Court show no comparable conduct.
Oral Contract
The appellant argues that if the written sales agreement is unenforceable because of a failure to meet the
condition precedent that there was nevertheless an oral
contract enforceable by the provisions of Section 70A-2201(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It should be noted that appellant did not plead an
oral contract or plead for such relief in the alternative
but rather plead and relied upon the written agreement
between the parties. The Court made no findings on the
matter and it appears that appellant is raising the matter
for the first time on appeal. Even so, appellant's argument is not sustainable. The referenced section only
comes into operation when there is "a contract which
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) of
70A-2-201." In the instant case, the parties did reduce
their agreement to writing and under such a condition
that contract governs the relationship between the parties. The statutory remedy only applies when the parties
had not otherwise reduced their contract to writing. As
is noted in Hawkland, Vol. 1, A Transactional Guide to
the Uniform Commercial Code,
The fact that a seller manufactures some
special goods does not prove that the buyer
requested him to do so. Of course, the excepDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion only deprives the buyer of the protection
of the Statute of Frauds, and he can still
defeat a fraudulent effort to thrust a nonexistent agreement upon him by showing that
no contract was made.
In effect ,the failure of the condition precedent means
that no contract was in fact made.
Further, the Record does not support the conclusion that the goods were unique to Rupp's situation.
Wash-A-Matic had two leads to sell the equipment but
it did not meet what the potential customers wanted.
Thereafter, the equipment was shipped back to the manufacturer (R. 100). This is not sufficient evidence of
specially manufactured goods as w o u l d show special
peculiarity to the respondent. See, Lee i>. Griffin, 1 BEST
&S272 (1860).
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO APPELLANT FOR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES OR
LOSS OF PROFITS.
Incidental Damages
The appellant contends that the respondent should
be liable for incidental damages it incurred as an aggrieved seller. This would include the cost of warehousing
the rejected car wash equipment and freight charges, §
70A-2-710, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides for incidental damages, but only where they result from a
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breach of contract. Since in the instant case there was
no breach of contract by Rupp, appellant is not entitled
to hold respondent liable for incidental damages.
Further, the appellant failed to prove incidental
damages. In an effort to prove incidental damages appellant offered into evidence Exhibits 5 through 7-P. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the court ruled the Exhibits
inadmissible. With reference to Exhibits 5 and 6-P, the
Court sustained the objection on the ground of hearsay
noting:
T H E C O U R T : I sustained the objection,
but I'm certain that I M L has copies of all the
charges, if we have to we can get them. I will
sustain it at this time. Maybe if you have anything to indicate that that is sufficient for damages of what they were charged I will listen
to it on that basis.
MR. D A V I E S : I would appreciate,
Your Honor, having an opportunity —
T H E C O U R T : I am not precluding you
from making a further offer but at this time
I will sustain the objection.
With reference to Exhibit 7-P the Court also sustained
a similar objection stating:
T H E C O U R T : I in effect will sustain
it, but I will reserve ruling. My indication is
that it shouldn't be received as not the best
evidence and being hearsay.
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MR. W E G G E L A N D : Yes, Sir.
T H E C O U R T : I would reserve ruling
on it. If I'm wrong that leaves the burden upon
Mr. Davies.
MR. D A V I E S : That's correct, Your
Honor. I understand that.
These exhibits were apparently prepared by Livingston,
Inc. and there was no foundation offered further on the
part of the appellant as to their preparation. Appellant
did not further renew its offer of these evidentiary items.
Under these circumstances, they cannot complain. The
general rule is stated in 88 ALR 2d 12 at page 124 as
follows:
The quite generally prevailing rule deducible from the cases is that where evidence
offered and objected to has been excluded
conditionally or temporarily, it becomes incumbent upon the party who sought to introduce such evidence to renew his effort in that
respect at a later, appropriate stage of the
trial by offering the evidence again or at least
by resuming a line of interrogation directed
toward getting such evidence into the record;
and if he fails to so actively renew his efforts
to introduce the evidence he ordinarily will be
precluded from contending on appeal that it
was erroneously excluded or that there was
error in the court's conditional or temporary
ruling.
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See also, State ex rel Simms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454
P.2d 56 (1969). The court having made a provisional
ruling and the appellant having failed to thereafter make
an appropriate offer of testimony, the appellant cannot
claim error on appeal. See Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 420,
149P.2d832 (1944).
Further, the trial Court's ruling was clearly correct.
Rule 63(13) Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the admission of business entries "if the judge finds that they
were made in the regular course of a business at or about
the time of the act . . . and that the sources of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their
timsitworthiness." In the instant case, no foundational
testimony was offered as to the preparation of the records or even to show that Livingston in fact prepared
them. They were merely copies of matters sent to WashA-Matic. There was no showing that they were in fact
business records kept in the regular course of business.
The purposes of Rule 63 (13) Utah Rules of Evidence are
to leave it to the judge to determine whether the sources
of information upon which the records are based reflect
trustworthiness. Comment, Rule 63(13) Uniform Rules
of Evidence in Jones, Evidence, 6th ed. Vol. 4 page 420.
Invoices that do not have sufficient foundation as to their
authenticity are not properly admitted. United States v.
Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2nd Cir. 1946); Annotation 21 ALR
2d 773. In the latter Annotation, it is noted at page 776:
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While it is well settled that these statutes
should be liberally interpreted so as to do away
with the anachronistic rules which gave rise to
their need and at which they were aimed, there
must apparently be some verification and authentication to make documentary evidence
sought to be introduced thereunder admissible.
See also, Polasky and Paulson, Business Entries, From
Common Law to The New Uniform Rules of Evidence
(With a Glance at The Utah Development) 4 Utah Law
Review 327 (1955). Consequently, appellant's claim for
incidental damages must be rejected.
Loss of I '}mfits
Respondent acknowledges that under Section 70A-2
708(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that loss of profits
may be an appropriate measure of damages in some cases.
However, before the appellant would be entitled to loss
of profits it would be necessary that there be a breach
of binding contract. Since the evidence supports the trial
Court's determination that there never was an obligation
on the part of the respondent to accept goods from the
appellant the appellant is not entitled to any damages
for loss of profits,
CONCLUSION
The evidence when viewed in a light most favorable
to the trial Court's ruling clearly supports the Findings
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and Judgment of the trial Court. The arguments raised
by the appellant on appeal, some for the first time, in
no way justify reversing the Findings and Judgment of
the trial Court. This Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
GERALD G. GUNDRY
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Respondent
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